Science and the Modern World: Lowell Lectures, 1925
Published 1948, The Macmillan Company
Alfred North Whitehead
Religion and Science
“Our directive wisdom, either as individuals or as communities, is less now than in the past. Perhaps it has slightly improved. But the novel pace of progress requires a greater force of direction if disasters are to be avoided. The point is that the discoveries of the nineteenth century were in the direction of professionalism, so that we are left with no expansion of wisdom and with greater need of it.”
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The general influence of science at the present moment can be analysed under the headings General Conceptions Respecting the Universe, Technological Applications, Professionalism Knowledge, Influence of Biological Doctrines on the Motives of Conduct. I have endeavoured in the preceding lectures to give a glimpse of these points. It lies within the scope of this concluding lecture to consider the reaction of science upon some problems confronting civilised societies.
The general conceptions introduced by science into modern thought cannot be separated from the philosophical situation as expressed by Descartes I mean the assumption of bodies and minds as independent individual substances, each existing in its own right apart from any necessary reference to each other. Such a conception was very concordant with the individualism which had issued from the moral discipline of the Middle Ages. But, though the easy reception of the idea is thus explained, the derivation in itself rests upon a confusion, very natural but none the less unfortunate The moral discipline had emphasised the intrinsic value of the individual entity This emphasis had put the notions of the individual and of its experiences into the background of thought At this point the confusion commences The emergent individual value of each entity is transformed into the independent substantial existence of each entity, which IS a very different notion
I do not mean to say that Descartes made this logical, or rather illogical transition, m the form of explicit reasoning Far from it What he did, was first to concentrate upon his own conscious experiences, as being facts within the independent world of his own mentality He was led to speculate in this way by the current emphasis upon the individual value of his total self He implicitly transformed this emergent individual value, inherent in the very fact of his own reality, into a private world of passions, or modes, of independent substance
Also the independence ascribed to bodily substances earned them away from the realm of values altogether They degenerated into a mechanism entiiely valueless, except as suggestive of an external ingenuity The heavens had lost the glory of God This state of mind is illustrated in the recoil of Protestantism from aesthetic effects dependent upon a material medium It was taken to lead to an ascription of value to what is m itself valueless This recoil was already m full strength antecedently to Descartes Accordingly, the Cartesian scientific doctrine of bits of matter, bare of intrinsic value, was merely a formulation, in explicit terms, of a doc- tiine which was current before its entrance into scientific thought or Cartesian philosophy Probably this doctrine was latent m the scholastic philosophy, but it did not lead to its consequences till it met with the mentality of northern Europe in the sixteenth century But science, as equipped by Descartes, gave stability and intellectual status to a point of view which has had very mixed effects upon the moral presuppositions of modem communities Its good effects arose from Its efficiency as a method tor scientific researchers within those limited regions which were then best suited for exploration The lesult was a general clearing of the Eu- ropean mind away from the stains left upon it by the hysteria of remote baibaric ages This was all to the good, and was most completely exemplified m the eighteenth century
But in the nineteenth century, when society was undergoing transformation into the manufacturing system, the bad effects of these doctrines have been very fatal The doctrine of minds, as independent substances, leads directly not merely to private worIds of experience, but also to private worlds of morals The moral intuitions can be held to apply only to the strictly private world of psychological experience Accordingly, self-respect, and the making the most of your own individual opportunities, together constituted the efficient morality of the leaders among the industrialists of that period The western world is now suffering from the limited moral outlook of the three previous generations
Also the assumption of the bare valuelessness of mere matter led to a lack of reverence in the treatment of natural or artistic beauty Just when the urbanization of the western world was entering upon its state of rapid development, and when the most delicate, anxious consideration of the aesthetic qualities of the new material environment was requisite, the doctrine of the irrelevance of such ideas was at its height In the most advanced industrial countries, art was treated as a frivolity A striking example of this state of mind m the middle of the nineteenth century is to be seen in London where the marvelous beauty of the estuary of the Thames, as it curves through the city, is wantonly defaced by the Charing Cross railway bridge, constructed apart from any reference to aesthetic values
The two evils are one, the ignoration of the true relation of each organism to its environment, and the other, the habit of ignoring the intrinsic worth of the environment which must be allowed its weight m any consideration of final ends.
Another great fact confronting the modern world is the discovery of the method of training professionals, who specialize in particular regions of thought and thereby progressively add to the sum of knowledge within their respective lmiitations of subject. In consequence of the success of this professionalising of knowledge, there are two points to be kept in mind, which differentiate our present age from the past. In the first place, the rate of progress is such that an individual human being, of ordinary length of life, will be called upon to face novel situations which find no parallel m his past. The fixed person tor the fixed duties, who m older societies was such a godsend, m the future will be a public danger. In the second place, the modem professionalism in knowledge works in the opposite direction so far as the intellectual sphere is concerned. The modern chemist is likely to be weak m zoology, weaker still m his general knowledge of the Elizabethan drama, and completely ignorant of the principles of rhythm in English versification. It is probably safe to ignore his knowledge of ancient history. Of course I am speaking of general tendencies, for chemists are no worse than engineers, or mathematicians, or classical scholars. Effective knowledge is professionalized knowledge, supported by a restricted acquaintance with useful subjects subservient to it.
This situation has its dangers. It produces minds in a groove. Each profession makes progress, but it is progress in its own groove. Now to be mentally in a groove is to live in contemplating a given set of abstractions. The groove prevents straying across country, and the abstraction abstracts from something to which no further attention is paid But there is no groove of abstractions which is adequate for the comprehension of human life. Thus in the modern world, the celibacy of the medieval learned class has been replaced by a celibacy of the intellect which is divorced from the concrete contemplation of the complete facts of course, no one is merely a mathematician or merely a lawyer. People have lives outside their professions or their businesses But the point is the restraint of serious thought within a groove The remainder of life is treated superficially, with the imperfect categories of thought derived from one profession.
The dangers arising from this aspect of professionalism are great, particularly in our democratic societies. The directive force of reason is weakened. The leading intellects lack balance. They see this set of circumstances or that set, but not both sets together. The task of coordination is left to those who lack either the force or the character to succeed in some definite career. In short, the specialised functions of the community are performed better and more progressively, but the generalised direction lacks vision. The progressiveness in detail only adds to the danger produced by the feebleness of coordination.
This criticism of modern life applies throughout, in whatever sense you construe the meaning of a community. It holds if you apply it to a nation, a city, a district, an institution, a family, or even to an individual. There is a development of particular abstractions, and a contraction of concrete appreciation. The whole is lost in one of its aspects. It is not necessary for my point that I should maintain that our directive wisdom, either as individuals or as communities, is less now than in the past. Perhaps it has slightly improved. But the novel pace of progress requires a greater force of direction if disasters are to be avoided. The point is that the discoveries of the nineteenth century were in the direction of professionalism, so that we are left with no expansion of wisdom and with greater need of it.
Wisdom IS the fruit of a balanced development It is this balanced growth of individuality which it should be the aim of education to secure The most useful discoveries for the immediate future would concern the furtherance of this aim without detriment to the necessary intellectual professionalism