Hegel Lectures – God

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

PART I

THE CONCEPTION OF RELIGION

 

With summaries and commentary by Beezone and others.

Hegel’s ‘Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion’ were delivered in Berlin during his tenure there, and the lectures on “God” most likely come from around 1821 to 1827, near the end of his life.

Hegel taught this course several times between 1821 and 1831, and what we now have as ‘The Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion’ is actually a reconstruction from students’ notes and editorial compilations after his death in 1831.

A.

GOD.

pp. 90-100

For us who are already in possession of religion, what God is, is something we are familiar with—a substantial truth which is present in our subjective consciousness. But scientifically considered, God is at first a general, abstract name, which as yet has not come to have any true value. For it is the Philosophy of Religion which is the unfolding, the apprehension of that which God is, and it is only by means of it that our philosophical knowledge of His nature is reached. God is this well- known and familiar idea—an idea, however, which has not yet been scientifically developed, scientifically known.

Having thus referred to this development, which has its justification in philosophical science itself, we shall, to begin with, accept as a simple statement of fact the assertion that the result of philosophy is that God is the absolutely True, the Universal in and for itself, the All­comprehending, All-containing, that from which every­thing derives subsistence. And in regard to this assertion we may also appeal in the first place to religious con- scibusness, where we find the conviction that God is indeed the absolutely True, from which all proceeds, and into which all returns, upon which all is dependent, and beside which nothing has absolute true self-sustained existence. This, then, is what constitutes the beginning.

Summary

Hegel opens by acknowledging that, for those who already possess religious belief, the idea of God may seem familiar and self-evident. However, from a philosophical standpoint, this familiarity is not yet grounded in scientific understanding. Philosophy’s task is to unfold and rigorously grasp what God truly is. Thus, the Philosophy of Religion begins not with dogma, but with the abstract concept of God, seeking to develop it into concrete understanding. The starting point, both in religion and in philosophy, is the shared conviction that God is the Absolute Truth—the universal source and sustaining ground of all that exists.

 

This beginning is, scientifically, still abstract. The heart may be ever so full of this idea, still in science it is not with what is in the heart that we have to do, but with what is definitely considered as object for con­sciousness, and more strictly for thinking consciousness which has attained to the form of thought. To give this fulness the form of thought, of the Notion, is the special work of the Philosophy of Religion.

a. The beginning as abstract, as the first content, Universality namely, has thus, as it were, as yet a sub­jective standing, implying that the Universal is universal for the beginning only, and does not continue in this condition of universality. The beginning of the content is itself to be conceived of in such a way that, while in all further developments of this content, this Universal will show itself to be absolutely concrete, rich in matter, and full of content, we at the same time do not pass beyond this universality ; that this universality, though in a sense we leave it behind so far as the form is con­cerned, inasmuch as it undergoes a definite development, nevertheless maintains its position as the absolute, per­manent foundation, and is not to be taken as a mere subjective beginning.

In so far as He is the Universal, God is for us from the point of view of development, what is shut up within itself, what is in absolute unity with itself. If we say God is that which is shut up within itself, in using such an expression we are thinking of a development which we expect to take place; but the undeveloped condition which we have called the Universality of God, is not in regard to the content itself to be taken as an abstract Universality, outside of which, and as opposed to which, the particular has an independent existence.

This Universality is thus to be understood as the absolutely full, filled up universality, and when we thus say that God is universal, concrete, full of content, we imply that God is One only, and not one as contrasted with many Gods,but that there is only the One, that is, God.

Summary

Although we begin with the idea that God is the Absolute, Hegel notes that this idea remains abstract until it is developed into a fully formed concept. Religious feeling may be full of meaning, but philosophy demands that such fullness be brought into thought — into conceptual clarity. The Philosophy of Religion works to give structure to this fullness by shaping it into a rational, developed notion. At the outset, God as the Universal appears as a starting abstraction, but this universality must be understood as inherently rich and complete — not empty or opposed to the particular. It is the self-contained fullness from which all else proceeds, and as such, affirms the unity and singularity of God — not as one among many, but as the only One.

 

Existing things, the developments of the natural and spiritual world, take manifold forms, and have an in­finite variety; they have a being which differs in degree, force, strength, content; but the being of all these things is not independent, but is supported by, dependent on, something else, and has no true independence. If we attribute a being to particular things, it is only a borrowed being, only the semblance of a being, not the absolute self-sustained Being, which is God.

God in His universality, this Universal, in which there is no limitation, no finiteness, no particularity, is the absolute Self-subsisting Being, and the only Self-subsisting Being; and what subsists has its root, its subsistence, in this One alone.

If the substantial element in this its first form is understood in this sense, we may express ourselves thus: God is the absolute Substance, the only true reality. All else, which is real, is not real in itself, has no real existence of itself; the one absolute reality is God alone, and thus He is the absolute Substance.

If this conception is held to in this abstract fashion, it is undoubtedly Spinozism. Substantiality, Substance as such, is as yet not at all differentiated from subjec­tivity. But the following thought also forms part of the presupposition thus made. God is Spirit, the Absolute Spirit, the eternally undifferentiated Spirit, essentially at home with Himself; this ideality, this subjectivity of Spirit, which is, so to speak, transparency, pure ideality excluding all that is particular, is just the Universality spoken of above, that pure relation to self, what is and remains absolutely at home with itself.

Summary

Here, Hegel contrasts the dependent, finite nature of all created things with the absolute independence of God. Everything in the natural and spiritual world has only a borrowed existence, lacking self-sustaining being. In contrast, God alone is the truly self-subsistent reality — the absolute Substance. At this stage, Hegel acknowledges that such a view resembles Spinoza’s philosophy, which sees all reality as one undivided substance. However, Hegel insists that God is not merely impersonal substance but Absolute Spirit — pure subjectivity that is fully present to itself. This self-related, transparent ideality is the deeper meaning of God’s universality: not a void abstraction, but Spirit at home with itself.

 

If we use the expression “ Substance,” it is implied that this Universal is not yet conceived of as concrete in itself: when it is so conceived of, it is Spirit; and Spirit too always is this unity with itself, even in its concrete inner determination—this One Reality, which we just now called Substance. A further characteristic is that the substantiality, the unity of the absolute reality with itself, is only the foundation, one moment in the deter­mination of God as Spirit. The disparagement of philo­sophy is connected mainly with this way of looking at the question. You hear it said that philosophy must be Spinozism if it is consistent, and that thus it is atheism, fatalism.

But at the beginning we have not as yet character­istics which are distinguished, as One and Another ; at the beginning we are only concerned with the One, not with the Other.

Summary

Hegel now clarifies that calling God “Substance” is only a starting point — one that lacks the full concreteness of Spirit. While Substance suggests self-contained being, it remains abstract unless it includes subjectivity. When the Universal is understood as Spirit, it becomes both self-related and internally rich. The unity of God with Himself — His substantiality — is only one moment in a fuller conception of God as Spirit. Critics often accuse philosophy of falling into Spinozism, and therefore atheism or fatalism, but Hegel emphasizes that at the beginning of inquiry, we must first grasp the One in its simplicity before introducing distinctions. The deeper understanding will come through development.

 

In starting from here we have the content as yet in the form of substantiality. Even when we say, “ God, Spirit,” these are indefinite words or general ideas. Everything depends upon what has entered into consciousness. At first it is the Simple, the Abstract, that enters into con­sciousness. In this first simplicity, we still have God in the character of Universality, but we do not remain at this standpoint.

Still, this content continues to be the foundation ; in all further development, God never comes out of His unity with Himself. When He, as it is commonly expressed, creates the world, there does not come into existence something evil, Another, which is self-sustained, and independent.

Summary

Hegel emphasizes that in the beginning, our idea of God remains abstract — a simple notion of substantiality or general terms like “God” or “Spirit.” These words are empty until filled with consciousness and thought. The process starts with simplicity, with God understood as Universal Being. However, this is only the foundation. As the concept develops, God remains in unity with Himself — even in the act of creation. The world does not emerge as something separate or opposed to God, but as something that remains grounded in divine unity. There is no true “Other” that stands independently against God.

 

b. This beginning is an object for us or content in us; we have this object; and thus the question imme­diately arises, Who are we ? “ We,” “ I,” the spirit is itself something very concrete, manifold. I have perceptions, I am, I see, hear, &c., all this I am; this feeling, this seeing. Thus the more precise meaning of this question is, which of these forms of consciousness determines the shape in which this content exists for our minds ? Is it found in idea, will, imagination, or feeling ? What is the place, where this content, this object has its home ? Which of all these supplies the basis of this mental possession ?

If we think of the current answers in regard to this, we find it said that God is in us in so far as we believe, feel, form ideas, know. These forms, faculties, aspects of ourselves, namely, feeling, faith, ordinary conception, are to be more particularly considered further on, and especially in relation to this very point. For the present we postpone the search for any reply, nor do we betake ourselves to what we know by experience, observation, namely that we have God in our feeling, &c. To begin with, we shall keep to what we have actually before us, this One, Universal, this Fulness, which is this ever un­changeable transparent ethereal element.

If in considering this One we ask, For which of our faculties or mental activities does this One, this pure Universal, exist ? we can only point to the corresponding activity of our mind, the faculty which answers to it, as the soil or substratum in which this content has its home. This is Thought.

Summary

Hegel now shifts focus to the question of the subject—the “we” or “I” that holds the idea of God. Human consciousness is multifaceted, including perception, feeling, will, and imagination. So, which aspect of ourselves is the true home for the content of God? Common answers point to feeling, belief, or intuition, but Hegel sets those aside for now. He insists that our starting point—the pure, universal idea of God—finds its proper place not in emotion or sensation, but in thought. Thought is the faculty within us that corresponds to the abstract, eternal nature of the divine content we are seeking to understand.

 

Thought alone is the substratum of this content. Thought is the activity of the Universal; it is the Universal in its activity, or operation ; or if we express it as the comprehension of the Universal, then that for which the Universal is, is still Thought.

This Universal, which can be produced by Thought, and which is for Thought, may be quite abstract; it is then the Immeasurable, the Infinite, the removal of all limit, of all particularity. This Universal, which is to begin with negative, has its seat in Thought only.

To think of God means to rise above what is sensuous, external, and individual. It means to rise up to what is pure, to that which is in unity with itself; it is a going forth above and beyond the sensuous, beyond what belongs to the sphere of the senses, into the pure region of the Universal. And this region is Thought.

Such, so far as the subjective side is concerned, is the substratum for this content. The content is this absolutely undivided, continuous, self-sufficing One, the Universal; and Thought is the mode of mind for which this Universal exists.

Summary

Hegel affirms that Thought alone is the proper ground for grasping the idea of God. Thought is not just an abstract activity—it is the operation of the Universal itself. To think God is to transcend the realm of the senses, to rise above the particular and enter the sphere of pure unity. While this Universal may at first appear abstract or negative—defined by the absence of limitation—it is precisely this quality that aligns it with Thought. Thought is the inner space where this undivided, self-sufficient One can be held and known. Thus, the domain of divine content is not feeling or imagination, but the clarity of reasoned reflection.

 

Thus we have a distinction between Thought and the Universal which we at first called God; it is a dis­tinction which in the first place belongs only to our reflection, and which is as yet by no means included in the content on its own account. It is the result of philosophy, as it is already the belief of religion, that God is the One true Reality, and that there is no other reality whatsoever. In this One Reality and pure clearness, the reality and the distinction which we call thinking, have as yet no place.

What we have before us is this One Absolute: we cannot as yet call this content, this determination, religion; for to religion belongs subjective spirit, con­sciousness. This Universal has its place in Thought, but its localisation in Thought is, to begin with, absorbed in this One, this Eternal, this absolute existence.

In this true, absolute, determination, which is only not as yet developed, perfected, God remains through all development absolute Substance.

Summary

Hegel now acknowledges a subtle but important distinction between Thought and the Universal we call God. This separation exists only from our perspective—it is a product of our reflection, not something inherent in the divine itself. From the standpoint of absolute reality, there is only God; no other reality or distinction, including thinking itself, has independent standing. At this early stage, we cannot yet speak of religion proper, since religion involves subjective consciousness. What we have is pure, undeveloped unity—God as absolute Substance. Though this Substance will eventually appear in consciousness and religious life, it begins here as the undivided ground from which all development proceeds.

 

This Universal is the starting-point and point of departure, but it is this absolutely abiding Unity, and not a mere basis out of which differences spring, the truth rather being that all differences are here enclosed within this Universal. It is, however, no inert, abstract Universal, but the absolute womb, the eternal impetus and source from which everything proceeds, to which everything returns, and in which everything is eternally preserved.

Thus the Universal never goes out of this ethereal element of likeness with itself, out of this state in which it is together with or at home with itself. It is not possible that God, as this Universal, can actually exist along with another whose existence is anything more than the mere play of appearance or semblance of existence. In relation to this pure Unity and pure transparency, matter is nothing impenetrable, nor has the spirit, the ” I,” such exclusiveness as to possess true substantiality of its own.”

Summary

Hegel emphasizes that the Universal is not a static starting point but the dynamic, ever-present ground in which all difference is already contained. It is not an empty abstraction but the living source—what he calls the absolute womb—from which all things arise and to which all things return. This Universal, identified with God, never departs from its essential unity and self-sameness. Nothing can exist alongside it with independent substance; otherness is mere appearance, not true being. Even matter and individual spirit—the “I”—do not possess reality apart from this transparent, all-encompassing ground.

 

c. There has been a tendency to call this idea by the name .’Pantheism; it would be more correctly designated, “the idea of substantiality.” God is here characterised at first as substance only; the absolute Subject, too, Spirit, remains substance; Spirit is not however substance only, but is also self-determined as Subject. Those who say that speculative philosophy is Pantheism, generally know nothing of this distinction; they overlook the main point, as they always do, and they disparage philosophy by representing it as different from what it really is.

Pantheism, with those who bring this charge against philosophy, has usually been taken to mean that every­thing, the All, the Universicm, this complex collection of all that exists, those infinitely many finite things are God, and philosophy is accused of maintaining that All is God—that is, this infinite manifoldness of single things; not the Universality which has essential being, but the individual things in their empirical existence, as they are immediately.

If it be said, God is all this here, this paper, &c., then that is certainly Pantheism, as understood by those who by way of reproach bring forward the objection to which reference has been made, their meaning being that God is everything, all individual things. If I say “ species,” that too is a universality, but of quite another kind than Totality, in which the Universal is thought of only as that which comprehends all individual existences, and as that which has Being, that which lies at the foundation of all things, the true content of all individual things.

Pantheism of this kind is not to be found in any religion, and the statement that it is so discoverable is wholly false. It has never occurred to any man to say, all is God—that is, things in their individuality or contingency—much less has it been maintained in any philosophy.

Summary

Hegel addresses the common charge that his philosophy promotes Pantheism, and he refutes it by making an essential distinction. The idea of God as Substance should not be confused with the belief that every individual thing—objects, events, or finite entities—is divine. True philosophy does not equate God with the sum of all things, but sees God as the Universal foundation in which all things have their being. Spirit, as God, is not merely substance but also subject—self-determining and conscious. Mischaracterizations of Pantheism reduce this deep insight to the mistaken view that “God is everything,” including trivial particulars. Hegel insists that no serious religion or philosophy has ever held that view.

 

With oriental pantheism, or more correctly Spinozism, we shall make acquaintance later on, under the head of definite religion. Spinozism itself as such, and oriental pantheism, too, contain the thought that in everything the divine is only the universal element of a content, the Essence of things, while at the same time it is also represented as being the determined or specific Essence of the things.

When Brahm says, “ I am the brightness, the shining element in metals, the Ganges among rivers, the life in all that lives, &c.,” what is individual is done away with and absorbed. Brahm does not say, “ I am the metal, the rivers, the individual things of each kind by themselves, as such, as they exist immediately.”

The brightness is not the metal itself, but is the Uni­versal, the Substantial, elevated above any individual form; it is no longer to Tav, everything as individual. What is expressed here is no longer what is called pantheism; the idea expressed is rather that of the Essence in such individual things.

All that has life is characterised by the note of time and space; it is, however, only on the imperishable element in this singularity that stress is laid. “ The life of all that lives ” is, in that imperishable sphere of life, the Unlimited, the Universal. When, however, it is said that everything is God, the singularity is under­stood in accordance with all its limits, its finiteness, its perishableness. ’ The origin of this idea of pantheism is to be found in the fact that stress is laid on the abstract, not on the spiritual unity; and then, when the idea takes its religious form, where only the substance, the One, ranks as true reality, those who hold these opinions forget that it is just in presence of this One that the individual finite things disappear, and have no reality ascribed to them, and yet they attempt to retain this reality in a material way alongside of the One. They do not believe the Eleatics, who say, the One only exists, and expressly add, and what is not has no existence whatever. All that is finite would be limitation, nega­tion of the One ; but that which is not, limitation, finite­ness, limit, and that which is limited, have no existence whatever.

Summary

Hegel continues to disentangle his philosophy from simplistic notions of Pantheism by contrasting it with Spinozism and Eastern religious ideas such as those in Hinduism. In these traditions, the divine is not the individual thing itself, but the universal essence within it—its imperishable, substantial element. For example, when Brahm identifies with light, life, or rivers, he speaks not as the object itself but as the eternal quality within it. True Pantheism, as often criticized, wrongly claims that every finite, limited thing as such is God. Hegel shows that in genuine spiritual insight, the finite dissolves into the infinite, and the emphasis lies on what is universal, not perishable. Critics miss this and try to retain the material or finite alongside the One, forgetting that in the presence of true Unity, finitude has no independent reality.

 

Spinozism has been charged with being atheism, but the world, this All, does not exist at all in Spinozism; it has an outward form it is true, we speak of its existence, and our life is to be in it as thus existing. In the philosophical sense, however, the world has no reality at all, has no existence. No reality is ascribed to these individual things; they are finite in nature, and it is plainly stated that they do not exist at all.

Spinozism has been universally charged with leading to the following conclusions :—If all be One, then this philosophy maintains that good is one with evil, and that there is no difference between good and evil, and with this all religion is done away with. You hear it asserted that if the distinction of good and evil is not valid in itself, then it is a matter of indifference whether a man be good or bad. It may, indeed, to conceded that the distinction between good and evil is done away with potentially, that is, in God, who is alone the true Reality. In God there is no evil; the distinction between good and evil could exist only if God were Evil; no one, however, would concede that evil is some­thing affirmative, and that this affirmative is in God.

God is good, and good alone ; the distinction between evil and good is not present in this One, in this Substance; it is with the element of distinction, or differentiation, that it first enters at all.

God is the One absolutely self-sufficing Being ; in sub­stance there is no distinction, no element of difference. With the distinction of God from the world, and especially from man, there first appears the distinction between good and evil. It is a fundamental principle of Spinozism, with regard to this distinction between God and man, that man must have God alone as his chief end. And thus the love of God is law for the element of differ­ence, that is to say, for man; this love to God is alone to be his guide ; he is not to ascribe value to his separate existence, to his difference in itself, not to desire to continue in it, but to direct his entire thought towards God alone.

Summary

Hegel defends Spinozism against the common accusation that it leads to atheism or moral relativism. He explains that, within Spinoza’s philosophy, the world of individual things has no ultimate reality—they are finite and illusory compared to the One true substance, which is God. Critics claim this view erases the distinction between good and evil, but Hegel clarifies that in God, who is the only true Reality, there is no evil—only good. The difference between good and evil arises only when distinction enters, particularly in the relation between God and the world, or God and man. For Spinoza, the human task is to transcend one’s finite separateness and direct all thought and desire toward God alone. Love for God becomes the ethical orientation that dissolves egoic self-assertion into unity with the divine.

 

This is the most sublime morality, that evil is non- existent and that man is not to allow to this distinction, this nullity, any valid existence. Man may wish to persist in this difference, to carry this separation on into a settled opposition to God—the essentially existing Universal—and then man is evil. But it is also pos­sible for him to regard his difference as non-existent, to place his true being in God alone, and direct his aim toward God—and then man is good.

In Spinozism, the distinction between good and evil undoubtedly mak6s its appearance with reference to God and man—and it appears in it with this qualification, that evil is to be regarded as non-existent. In God as such, in His character as Substance, there is no distinc­tion ; it is for man that this distinction exists, as does also the distinction between good and evil.

In accordance with that superficiality with which the polemic against philosophy is carried on, it is added, moreover, that philosophy is a system of Identity. It is quite correct to say that Substance is this one self­identity, but Spirit is just as much this self-identity^

Everything is ultimately identity, unity with itself. But those who speak of the philosophy of Identity mean abstract Identity, unity in general, and pay no attention to that upon which alone all depends; namely, the essential nature of this unity, and whether it is defined as Substance or as Spirit. The whole of philosophy is nothing else than a study of the nature of different kinds of unity; the Philosophy of Religion, too, is a suc­cession of unities ; it is always unity, yet a unity which is always further defined and made more specific.

Summary

Hegel elevates Spinoza’s ethics by stating its core moral insight: evil has no true existence. The highest morality lies in refusing to grant separateness—or the distinction between good and evil—any ultimate reality. When a person clings to their separateness in opposition to the divine unity, they become evil; but when they dissolve their will into God’s, they are good. While distinctions such as good and evil exist for human beings, in God—as pure Substance—no such duality exists. Hegel criticizes those who dismiss philosophy as merely a “system of identity,” pointing out that what matters is how unity is defined: as abstract Substance or as living Spirit. Philosophy is not about undifferentiated sameness but about exploring the evolving nature of unity. The Philosophy of Religion traces a sequence of increasingly rich and specific forms of divine unity.

 

In the physical world there are many kinds of unity: when water and earth are brought together, this is a unity, but it is a mixture. If I bring together a base and an acid and a salt, a crystal is the result. I have water too, but I cannot see it, and there is not the slightest moisture. The unity of the water with this material is, therefore, a unity of quite a different character from that in which water and earth are mingled. What is of importance, is the difference in the character of the unity. The Unity of God is always Unity, but every­thing depends upon the particular nature of this Unity; this point being disregarded, that upon which everything depends is overlooked. 

What we have first is this divine Universality—Spirit in its entirely undetermined Universality—for which there exists absolutely no element of difference. But upon this absolute foundation (and this we state for the moment as fact) there now appears that element of distinction which, in its spiritual character, is conscious­ness, and it is with this distinction that religion, as such, begins. AVhen the absolute Universality advances to the stage of judgment, that is to say, when it proceeds to posit itself as determinateness, and God exists as Spirit for Spirit, we have reached the standpoint from which God is regarded as the object of consciousness, and Thought, which at the beginning was universal, is seen to have entered into the condition of relation and differentiation.

Summary

Hegel illustrates that not all forms of unity are the same—some are mere mixtures, while others, like a crystal, represent a deeper integration. The key insight is that it’s not enough to say “unity” or “oneness”; everything depends on the kind of unity involved. God’s unity is always one, but its specific character evolves. At first, we have the pure, undifferentiated Universality of Spirit, without distinction. But religion begins when distinction arises—specifically as consciousness. When the Absolute posits itself as determinate, as Spirit for Spirit, God becomes an object of consciousness. This marks the moment where thought, once entirely universal, enters into the realm of relation, and with it, religion truly begins.

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Q and A

Ed: Firstly, given what Hegel has just written and you’ve summarized would you say Hegel believes in God? Or is ‘believes’ even an appropriate term to use when talking about Hegel and his…? Conception of God?

 

Professor: That’s a fitting question, Ed — and you’re absolutely right to pause over the word “believes.” When it comes to Hegel, that term might not carry the right weight or precision. Let’s break this down in the spirit of what we’ve just explored.

Does Hegel ‘believe’ in God?

If by belief we mean the ordinary, perhaps even devotional sense of affirming the existence of a personal deity (as in traditional religious faith), then no, Hegel doesn’t “believe” in God in that way. Hegel is not a theologian of orthodoxy; he is a philosopher of Spirit.

But if we ask instead: Does Hegel affirm God as a real, central, and necessary reality?—then the answer is absolutely yes. Hegel’s entire system unfolds around the concept of the Absolute, which he identifies as God, but not as an anthropomorphic or mythic being. God, for Hegel, is the Absolute Spirit: the ground of all being, all becoming, all thought—and the goal of its own self-realization.

Is ‘belief’ the wrong term?

Yes—believes is inadequate for Hegel, because it suggests a subjective stance toward an external object. That’s the I-It posture, to borrow Buber’s language. Hegel’s God is not something outside us to be believed in, but the living movement of Spirit in and as us—thought thinking itself, consciousness becoming fully aware of its own essence.

A better verb might be:

• Conceives

• Recognizes

• Unfolds

• Comprehends

In Hegel’s terms: *“To know God is to think God”—*and to think God is to enter into the process by which Spirit comes to know itself.

Hegel’s ‘Conception of God’

From what we’ve just worked through, we can say that for Hegel:

• God is not a being among other beings.

• God is the universal, self-relating totality—the Absolute.

• Initially, God is the Universal Substance (like in Spinoza), but ultimately, God is also Subject—Spirit knowing itself.

Importantly, Hegel’s God is not static. The divine undergoes development through nature, history, and human consciousness. This is not a diminishing of God, but rather the dialectical movement of God realizing Himself—culminating in what he calls “God as Spirit for Spirit.”

So Hegel doesn’t “believe in God” in the traditional sense—he thinks God through and as the process of Absolute knowing.

 

Ed: Given what Hegel says about ‘God’ where does morality originate? If at all.

Professor: Excellent follow-up, Ed—and it goes right to the heart of what makes Hegel both difficult and brilliant. To ask where morality originates in Hegel’s system, especially given what he says about God, is to ask:

How does distinction—and specifically the distinction between right and wrong—emerge within a system that begins in undifferentiated Unity?

So let’s work through this carefully, in Hegelian spirit and structure.

1. At the Origin: No Morality Yet

In the beginning of Hegel’s system—as we just explored—there is only the Absolute Universal, undivided, self-identical, without distinction. This is God as pure Being or Substance, before Spirit has become self-conscious.

At this stage:

• There is no good or evil.

• No judgment.

• No morality. Because morality requires distinction: between self and other, action and consequence, good and evil. But in the pure Universal, there is only unity.

2. Morality Appears with Distinction (Spirit as Subject)

Morality enters when differentiation arises—when God becomes an object to Himself through Spirit.
This happens when:

• The Absolute posits itself in the form of consciousness (what Hegel calls “judgment” or Entzweiung, separation).

• With this, the finite self emerges as distinct from God.

Here, morality begins. Why?

Because now there is:

• A self who acts,

• A world in which consequences unfold,

• A standard (the Absolute) against which those acts can be measured.

Morality is not grounded in arbitrary commandments or subjective preference—it is grounded in the movement of Spirit itself as it awakens to its own self-difference.

3. Morality as the Struggle of Reconciliation

Morality, then, for Hegel, is the initial response to separation. It is the individual will trying to align itself with the Universal.

But—and this is key—morality is not the end point.

Hegel critiques mere “morality” (Moralität)—especially as Kant conceived it—as being too focused on the individual’s internal duty. That’s a step forward from arbitrary law, but it still traps the moral agent in duality:

• Between ought and is,

• Between individual will and universal law.

True reconciliation only comes when morality matures into ethical life (Sittlichkeit)—where the individual and the universal are not opposed, but integrated through institutions like:

• The family (natural ethical life),

• Civil society (individual rights in interaction),

• The state (the highest embodiment of ethical unity, in Hegel’s view).

4. God and Morality

So where does this leave us?

• God is not the lawgiver who hands down morality from above.

• Nor is God indifferent to good and evil.

• Rather, God is the process by which Spirit comes to recognize itself—and morality is a necessary moment within that process.

Evil, in this scheme, is not some external force—it is the refusal to return to the universal, the insistence on remaining in separation. As Hegel put it:

“Man is evil when he insists on his own separateness.”

And good? Good is the movement back toward unity—not abstract unity, but unity in and through distinction. That’s what makes it spiritual and not merely moral.

Summary:

• Morality originates not at the beginning, but with the emergence of difference—when Spirit becomes conscious of itself as other.

• It’s a transitional stage, rooted in the tension between individual will and universal truth.

• True ethical realization is not obedience but integration—the reconciliation of self and Spirit, of finite and infinite.

• Morality is thus a necessary moment in the dialectical self-unfolding of God.

 

Ed: It seems “judgment” is crucial in understanding Hegel. It’s almost like another version, though philosophical, of ‘The Garden’ and Adam and Eve.

 

Professor: Yes—aptly said, Ed. You’re absolutely right: “judgment” (Gericht / Urteil) in Hegel plays a central and symbolic role, and your instinct to connect it to The Garden and the Fall of Adam and Eve is deeply insightful. In fact, let’s linger there for a moment, because what you’re noticing opens up a rich, mytho-philosophical parallel.

1. Judgment as Division (Ur-teil)

In German, Hegel uses the word Urteil for “judgment.” But unlike the English word, Urteil contains within it:

• Ur = original, primal

• Teil = division, separation

So judgment for Hegel is not just a legal or ethical pronouncement—it is the primordial act of division. It’s the moment when unity is split—when the original undivided wholeness (the Absolute) enters into differentiation.

This is the moment of Spirit’s awakening. But it’s also a kind of Fall.

2. The Garden of Eden Parallel

Let’s follow the myth:

• In Genesis, Adam and Eve eat from the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil—and suddenly, they see themselves as separate.

• Naked, ashamed, self-conscious—they’ve entered duality: good vs. evil, self vs. other, God vs. human.

Hegel would say: This is the moment of consciousness—the emergence of Spirit through judgment.
It is the beginning of morality, of alienation, and the beginning of the journey back.

So yes: Hegel’s “judgment” is a philosophical retelling of Eden.

It’s the very same structure:

• Undivided unity → separation through knowledge → alienation → return.

Except for Hegel, it’s not a sin—it’s a necessary moment in the evolution of Spirit. The Fall is not a mistake, but the first step toward reconciliation.

3. Judgment as Dialectic

Judgment isn’t the end for Hegel. It’s the middle term in a dialectic:

1. Thesis – The One, undivided God/Spirit

2. Antithesis – Judgment (division, alienation, self-consciousness)

3. Synthesis – Reconciliation (Spirit recognizing itself in and through the other)

So what religion calls redemption, Hegel calls reconciliation of Spirit with itself through history, ethics, art, and ultimately, philosophy.

4. The Cross as Judgment and Return

We might also recall that in Christian theology, Christ is “judged”—and this judgment becomes the pivot for redemption. For Hegel, this isn’t just religious metaphor; it reflects the logic of the Absolute:

• God becomes man (distinction)

• Man is judged (suffers alienation)

• Spirit returns to itself (resurrection/reconciliation)

It’s why Hegel famously says:

“God is not God without the death of God.”

Judgment is the turning point—not the end of the story.

Final Thoughts:

At the Edge of the Modern Mind

19th – 20th Century

Hegel’s philosophy is a reimagining of the “Fall”—not as test and failure, but as the beginning of consciousness.

Hegel wrote at a pivotal moment in the history of Western consciousness. The early 19th century stood as both culmination and turning point—a time when the rational achievements of the Enlightenment had matured, and the philosophical project of self-knowledge had reached its most sophisticated form. Reason, logic, and empiricism had come to dominate the intellectual imagination. In recovering the methods of ancient Greece—particularly Aristotle—the modern West believed itself to be returning to the clarity and discipline of first principles.

But the Renaissance had added something the Greeks never had: the full weight of Christian eschatology, the growing legacy of modern individuality, and the rise of empiricism—the conviction that reality is to be known primarily through sense experience and observation. This empirical turn, brought forward by Bacon, Galileo, Newton and others, replaced symbolic and metaphysical worldviews with measurable, testable frameworks. The world, once understood as a living expression of logos, became a field of force, mass, and motion. Humanity, once seen as a reflection of the divine, was now the rational subject operating within a universe of detached objects.

Yet something else was stirring. As Europe expanded its global reach through colonialism and scholarship, the ancient texts of India and the East began to filter into the European mind. Through translations and philosophical interest, especially among the Germans, Western thinkers encountered the Upanishads, the Bhagavad Gītā, and various schools of Vedānta and Buddhism. These traditions offered a radically different—but hauntingly familiar—vision: that ultimate reality is undivided, that the individual self is an illusion born of ignorance, and that liberation comes through recognition, not conquest.

As sophisticated and philosophically mind-bending as both Western and Eastern systems can become, when you finally “skin the cat”, they both seem to say the same thing. That is: evil is not in God, and not in “the world” per se. It is in man—specifically in his/her refusal to see their separation as illusion, the absolute insistence on maintaining their own isolated selfhood. The “human individual,” as Hegel put it, becomes evil when he clings to his own difference in opposition to the Universal. Whether one calls it ego, sin, or avidyā, the result is the same: the exile from wholeness is not imposed—it is chosen, even if unconsciously.

Hegel’s reaction to this fragmentation was not to reject reason, but to transfigure it. He did not retreat from the empirical world, nor did he deny the necessity of logic and analysis. But he refused to let them stand alone. For Hegel, reason had to be folded back into Spirit—the living process by which reality becomes conscious of itself. Truth, for Hegel, is not a static proposition or a body of evidence, but the movement by which the Absolute comes to recognize itself through nature, history, art, religion, and philosophy. This is why Hegel insists that evil is not a thing or a force, but the refusal of return. Separation is a moment—necessary, even sacred—but not the goal.

In this, he shares more with the mystics than the rationalists. The moment of judgment (Urteil), the “fall” into difference, is not a mistake but a beginning. It echoes the story of the Garden: undivided unity is shattered by knowledge, shame, and separation. But Hegel, unlike theology, does not see this as a catastrophe—it is Spirit becoming aware. And the return is not to innocence, but to reconciliation: the wholeness that comes after the wound has been seen, endured, and understood.

By the end of the 19th century, this great arc of thought had carried the Western mind to the very threshold of something new. Hegel and his contemporaries brought philosophy to the edge of modernity, where Spirit stood exposed—suspended between fragmentation and wholeness, between knowledge and being, between exile and home. It is from this edge that others, in the next century, would begin again.

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